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Abstract
In authentication protocols, anonymity is for privacy, while deniability is for anti-forensics after
completion of the protocols. We propose a syntax and security definitions of an anonymous deniable
predicate authentication scheme with revocability (rADPA). This new cryptographic primitive is
to attain revocation function and strong privacy guarantee with predicate authentication, where a
predicate is a boolean function over attributes of participants. We also give a generic construction
of our rADPA scheme. Our approach is to build-in the revocable attribute-based encryption scheme
proposed by K.Yamada et al. (ESORICS2017) into the anonymous deniable predicate authentication
scheme proposed by S.Yamada et al. (PKC2012). Finally, we discuss how our rADPA scheme can
be instantiated by employing concrete building blocks in our generic construction.
Keywords: anonymous authentication, attribute, deniability, revocation
1 Introduction
For our activity on networks involving private devices, authentication is one of the three fundamental
processes for security (i.e. identification, authentication and authorization). We have been receiving
benefits of information using communication devices and infrastructures such as smartphones and the
internet in our daily lives, and those benefits are basically after logging-in to the networks and devices.
There the authentication mechanisms is running with hash functions, symmetric-key schemes, public-key
infrastructures and various cryptographic protocols.
Recently, more need of privacy protection is arising among participants of networks. One motivating
trend is expansion of social networking services (SNSs). The participants, using pseudonyms, are com-
municating with each other on the networks, but they are under the fear of being traced and punished
due to some unsuitable behaviors. This is actually a serious problem because there are news that famous
SNS companies leak personal data of participants in response to demands of governments.
To solve the above problem on privacy protection, we propose a cryptographic scheme which we
call an anonymous deniable predicate authentication scheme with revocability (rADPA). An anonymous
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authentication is already well-known technique based on tokens issued by authorities. Especially, a
cryptographic primitive called attribute-based encryption scheme (ABE) [17] can be used to execute an
anonymous challenge-and-response authentication protocol. In a key-policy ABE scheme (KP-ABE)
introduced by the work of Goyal, Pandey, Sahai and Waters [14, 16], a secret key is associated with
an access policy which is a boolean formula over attributes, while a ciphertext is associated with a set
of attributes. In a dual manner, in a ciphertext-policy ABE scheme (CP-ABE) [14, 21], a ciphertext is
associated with access policy over attributes, while a secret key is associated with a set of attributes. In
a KP-ABE or CP-ABE scheme, a secret key works to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if the associated
set of attributes satisfies the associated access policy, and hence the challenge-and-response protocol
works for a prover to be authenticated based on attributes and policies. This protocol resembles the
traditional role-based access control (RBAC). However, the feature of the ABE-based protocol is that it
attains attribute privacy; in the case of CP-ABE, the verifier in the authentication protocol can not decide
which satisfying assignment of attributes is used for a boolean formula after a session, and vice versa in
the case of KP-ABE. Attribute privacy is a strong privacy notion, and anonymity is assured by attribute
privacy [14]. Currently the notion of an ABE scheme is generalized into a broader notion of a predicate
encryption scheme (PE) [24], where key attributes and ciphertext attributes are used instead of attributes
and policies.
Deniability is a different aspect of privacy protection. As is defined in Dodis et al. [10], a deniable
authentication scheme guarantees a seemingly paradoxical property: Upon completion of the protocol
the verifier in an authentication server is convinced that the prover is certainly a one who has satisfying
key attributes in the case of our scenario. However, neither party can convince anyone else (a third
entity) that the other party took part in the protocol. Thus, deniability is a property of anti-forensics, and
it is useful for participants who want to feel free of putting any message in SNS without any fear. We
stress that deniability is not implied by anonymity, and vice versa. This is because anonymity of a prover
might be broken by the server log-data. Nonetheless, deniability guarantees that the log-data can not
be witness for the server to claim to a third entity that the prover actually logged in. Conversely, if the
timing analysis is executed, then deniability might be broken. Nonetheless, anonymity guarantees that
the prover can not be identified among the set of possible provers that have attributes satisfying a policy
of the verifier.
Anonymous deniable predicate authentication schemes (ADPAs) with the above two properties were
studied by S. Yamada et al. [24]. Actually they gave a generic construction of an ADPA scheme, and
discussed instantiations. The idea in [24] is to enhancing the challenge-and-response authentication pro-
tocol (which uses a predicate encryption scheme) by adding another four rounds of message-transactions
employing a perfectly binding commitment scheme.
1.1 Our Contribution
Following the previous work [24], we further pursue a must function of authentication schemes; that
is, revocation. In an authentication scheme an authority has to activate a participant, and has to revoke
a participant when it is needed in the cases such as expiration of attributes and irregular behavior of
participants. To attain the revocability we look into another previous work by K. Yamada et al. [22, 23],
in which they proposed a revocable attribute-based encryption scheme (rABE). Combining the previous
schemes for our purpose, we propose an anonymous deniable predicate authentication scheme with
revocability (rADPA). That is, we substitute the pair of a ciphertext attribute and a revocation list (Y,RL )
of rABE with the original ciphertext attribute Y of the predicate encryption scheme. We note that our
new scheme is not a trivial combination of two schemes from previous works. This is because we has
to check verifiability and chosen-ciphertext security when combining the two schemes, which will be
explained in Section 5.
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Practicality and Feasibility In a session of our authentication protocol, we need six rounds of interaction
between a prover and a verifier. If we would not pursue deniability, then only two rounds were needed
(i.e. challenge-and-response). Thus, to attain deniability, we add four more rounds. Computational
overhead is mostly occupied by that of encryption-and-decryption of a random message with rABE and
that of generation of commitments. More precisely, their asymptotic behaviors are as follows. Let λ be
the security parameter and κ be the attribute index. The former is linear to λ ·κ , and the latter is linear
to λ 2. As for data lengths, they are mostly occupied by that of a ciphertext of rABE and that of 2λ
commitments. In the similar way, the former is linear to λ ·κ , and the latter is linear to λ 2. However,
if we employ a constant-size ciphertext ABE (such as [18, 19]), then the above estimation of asymptotic
behaviors changes.
A remark on feasibility is that, in our rADPA scheme, a revocation list RL can be maintained by
a verifier. This feature, which is called direct revocation in [23], is actually useful compared with a
certificate revocation list (CRL) maintained by a certificate authority (CA).
1.2 Organization of This Paper
In Section 2 we summarize the needed notions and notations. In Section 3 we define the syntax and
security of our rADPA. In Section 4 we give a generic construction of our rADPA. In Section 5 we
discuss how our rADPA can be instantiated. In Section 6 we conclude our work, and mention our future
work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we prepare for the needed notations and notions to describe and discuss our scheme in
the remaining sections.
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N. The security parameter is denoted by λ , where λ ∈ N.
The residue class ring of integers modulo a prime number p is denoted by Zp. The number of elements
of a set S is denoted by |S|. The bit length of a string s is denoted by |s|. The inverted value of a bit b
is denoted by b̄ (i.e. b̄ := 1− b). A uniform random sampling of an element a from a set S is denoted
as a ∈R S. The expression a =? b returns a value 1 when a = b and 0 otherwise. When an algorithm
A on input a outputs z, we denote it as z← A(a), or, A(a)→ z. When a probabilistic algorithm A on
input a and with randomness r returns z, we denote it as z← A(a;r) When two probabilistic interactive
algorithms A and B, on common input x and private input a to A, interact with each other and B outputs
z, we denote it as z← 〈A(a),B〉(x). When an algorithm A accesses an oracle O , we denote it as AO . A
probability P is said to be negligible in λ if for any given positive polynomial poly(λ ) P < 1/poly(λ )
for sufficiently large λ . Two probabilities P and Q are said to be computationally indistinguishable if
|P−Q| is negligible in λ , which is denoted as P≈c Q.
2.1 Terminologies
• ID = {0,1}k : The space of identity strings of bit-length k.
• m := |ID | : The total number of possible identity strings; m = 2k.
•RL : The revocation list, which is a subset of ID .
• B : The upper bound of the number of revoked identity strings. That is, |RL | should be less than B
(|RL |< B).
• κ : The index which describes an attribute set and also a predicate function. κ ∈ Nc for a constant c.
• Xκ : The set of all key attributes under the index κ .
• Yκ : The set of all ciphertext attributes under the index κ .
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• Rκ : Xκ×Yκ →{0,1} : A predicate function on Xκ×Yκ , which determines a relation under the index
κ (i.e. a subset Rκ := {(X ,Y ) ∈ Xκ ×Yκ | Rκ(X ,Y ) = 1}).
•RF := {Rκ}κ∈Nc : The family of the predicate functions, that is, a relation family.
2.2 Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme [22, 23]
A revocable attribute-based encryption scheme rABE is defined with a given relation family
RF . rABE consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (PPTs for short): rABE =
(Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec).
• Setup(1λ ,κ)→ (PK,MSK). This PPT algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and the
attribute index κ which describes a predicate function. It returns a public key PK and a master secret key
MSK.
• KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK)→ SKXid. This PPT algorithm takes as input a key attribute X , an identity
string id, the public key PK and the master secret key MSK. It returns a private secret key SKXid.
• Enc((Y,RL ),PK,M)→CT . This PPT algorithm takes as input a ciphertext attribute Y , the revocation
list RL , the public key PK and a plaintext M. It returns a ciphertext CT .
• Dec(SKXid,(Y,RL ),PK,CT )→ M̃. This deterministic polynomial-time algorithm takes as input a
private secret key SKXid, the public key PK and a ciphertext CT . It returns a decryption result M̃.
2.2.1 Correctness of Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme
Correctness of rABE is defined as the correctness as an attribute-based encryption scheme in the follow-
ing way. First we extend the predicate function Rκ on a key attribute X and a ciphertext attribute Y into
R̄κ by doing substitution X ← (X ,id) and Y ← (Y,RL ) so that R̄κ captures whether the id ∈RL holds
or not:
R̄κ((X ,id),(Y,RL )) def=
{
1 if Rκ(X ,Y ) = 1∧id /∈RL ,
0 otherwise.
rABE is said to be correct when, for any λ ∈ N, any κ ∈ Nc, any (X ,id) ∈ Xκ × ID and
any (Y,RL ) ∈ Yκ × 2ID , s.t. R̄κ((X ,id),(Y,RL )) = 1, and any message M, it holds that
Pr[M = M̃ | Setup(1λ ,κ)→ (PK,MSK),Enc((Y,RL ),PK,M)→ CT,KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK)→
SKXid,Dec(SK
X
id,(Y,RL ),PK,CT )→ M̃] = 1.
2.2.2 IND-CCA Security of Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme
Security of indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA security) of rABE is defined




((M0,M1),(Y ∗,RL ∗),St)← ADEC,KG(PK,κ)
b ∈R {0,1},CT ∗← Enc((Y ∗,RL ∗),PK,Mb), b∗← ADEC,KG(CT ∗,St)
If b = b∗ then return WIN else return LOSE
The two chosen plaintexts should be equal length: |M0| = |M1|. A accesses two oracles. One is the
decryption oracle DEC. Sending ((Xi,idi),(Yi,RLi,CTi)), A queries DEC for the decryption of CTi.
The other is the key-generation oracle KG. Sending (X j,id j), A queries KG for a private secret key
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SKX jid j . The numbers qdec and qkey of the both queries (i = 1, . . . ,qdec, j = 1, . . . ,qkey) are bounded by
a polynomial in λ . The declared (Y ∗,RL ∗) are called the target ciphertext attribute and the target
revocation list, respectively. Two restrictions are imposed: First, A is not allowed to issue a decryption
query ((Xi,idi),(Yi,RLi,CTi)) s.t. R̄
κ
((Xi,idi),(Yi,RLi)) = 1 and (Yi,RLi,CTi) = (Y ∗,RL ∗,CT ∗).
Second, A is not allowed to issue a key-extraction query (X j,id j) s.t. R̄
κ
((X j,id j),(Y ∗,RL ∗)) = 1. The





Pr[Exprind-ccarABE,A(1λ ,κ) returns WIN]. rABE is said to be IND-CCA secure if, for any given PPT algorithm
A, Advind-ccarABE,A(λ ,κ) is negligible in λ .
The notion of semi-adaptive IND-CCA security [9, 13] is defined by imposing A to declare the target
after seeing PK and public parameters but before issuing any queries.
Exprind-semiad-ccarABE,A (1
λ ,κ)
(PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ ,κ), ((M0,M1),(Y ∗,RL ∗),St)← A(PK,κ)
b ∈R {0,1},CT ∗← Enc((Y ∗,RL ∗),PK,Mb), b∗← ADEC,KG(CT ∗,St)
If b = b∗ then return WIN else return LOSE
The advantage Advind-semiad-ccarABE,A (λ ,κ) is defined in the same way.
2.2.3 Verifiability of Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme [24]
Verifiability of rABE is defined as the following property. For any λ ∈ N, any κ ∈ Nc, any
(PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ ,κ), any (X ,id),(X ′,id′) ∈ Xκ ×ID , any (Y,RL ) ∈ Yκ ×2ID , any SKXid←
KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK) and any SKX
′
id′ ← KeyGen((X ′,id′),PK,MSK), if R̄
κ
((X ,id),(Y,RL )) =
R̄κ((X ′,id′),(Y,RL )), then for any CT ∈ {0,1}∗ it holds that Dec(SKXid,(Y,RL ),PK,CT ) =
Dec(SKX
′
id′ ,(Y,RL ),PK,CT ).
2.3 Commitment Scheme [8, 12]
A commitment scheme CmtSch consists of three PPT algorithms: CmtSch =
(Cmt.Setup,Cmt.Com,Cmt.Open). Let M , R and C be the message, randomness and com-
mitment spaces, respectively.
• Cmt.Setup(1λ )→ CK. This PPT algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ . It returns a
commitment key CK.
• Com(CK,M;γ)→ C. This PPT algorithm takes as input the commitment key CK and a message
M ∈M . It returns a commitment C ∈ C and an opening key γ ∈R R which is the randomness used to
generate C.
• Open(C,γ)→ M̂. This deterministic polynomial-time algorithm takes as input a commitment C ∈ C
and the opening key γ ∈R It returns an opened message M̂ that should be in M .
Correctness should hold for CmtSch (omitted).
Definition 1 (Perfectly Binding [12]). A commitment scheme CmtSch is said to be perfectly binding if it
satisfies the following condition for some unbounded algorithm Cmt.Open: For any security parameter
1λ , any commitment key CK← Cmt.Setup(1λ ) and any message M,
Pr[M = M′ | (C,γ)← Cmt.Com(M;γ),M′← Cmt.Open(C)] = 1.
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Definition 2 (Computationally Hiding [12]). A commitment scheme CmtSch is said to be computation-
ally hiding if it satisfies the following condition: For any security parameter 1λ , any commitment key
CK← Cmt.Setup(1λ ) and any PPT algorithm A,
Pr[A(St,C) = 1 | (M,M′,St)← A(CK),(C,γ)← Cmt.Com(M)]
≈c Pr[A(St,C′) = 1 | (M,M′,St)← A(CK),(C′,γ ′)← Cmt.Com(M′)]. (1)
3 Syntax and Security Definitions of Anonymous Deniable Predicate Au-
thentication Scheme with Revocability
In this section, we give a syntax of an anonymous deniable predicate authentication scheme that has
the function of revocability. We denote the scheme by rADPA. Then we define three security notions:
concurrent soundness, anonymity and deniability. The syntax and security definitions are in accordance
with the previous work [24].
3.1 Syntax
Our rADPA consists of four PPTs: rADPA = (Setup,KeyGen,P,V).
• Setup(1λ ,κ)→ (PK,MSK). This PPT algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and the
attribute index κ which describes a predicate function. It returns a public key PK and a master secret key
MSK.
• KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK)→ SKXid. This PPT algorithm takes as input a key attribute X , an identity
string id, the public key PK and the master secret key MSK. It returns a private secret key SKXid.
• 〈P(SKXid),V〉((Y,RL ),PK)→ 1/0. These interactive PPT algorithms take as common input a cipher-
text attribute and a revocation list (Y,RL ) and the public key PK, and as private input to P a private
secret key SKXid. P and V interact with each other for at most a polynomial number of rounds in λ . Then
V finally returns a decision 1 or 0.
3.2 Security Definitions
3.2.1 Concurrent Soundness
Intuitively, concurrent soundness means security against misauthentication caused by an adversary which












If b = 1 then return WIN else return LOSE
Two restrictions are imposed: First, A is not allowed to relay the messages even in partial. Second, A is
not allowed to issue a key-extraction query (X j,id j) s.t. R̄
κ
((X j,id j),(Y ∗,RL ∗)) = 1.
The advantage Advc-soundrADPA,A(λ ,κ) of A over rADPA is defined as the winning probability:
Advc-soundrADPA,A(λ ,κ)
def
= Pr[Exprc-soundrADPA,A(1λ ,κ) returns WIN]. rADPA is said to be (adaptively) concurrently
sound if, for any given PPT algorithm A, Advc-soundrADPA,A(λ ,κ) is negligible in λ .
6
Anonymous Deniable Predicate Authentication Scheme with Revocability H. Anada and Y. Ueshige
The notion of semi-adaptive concurrent soundness is defined by imposing A to declare the target
after seeing PK and public parameters but before issuing any queries.
Exprsemiad-c-soundrADPA,A (1
λ ,κ)





If b = 1 then return WIN else return LOSE




λ ,κ) returns WIN].
3.2.2 Anonymity
Intuitively, anonymity means privacy which is indistinguishability between satisfying two patterns of key









































If b = b∗ then return WIN else return LOSE




∣∣Pr[ExpranonymrADPA,A(1λ ,κ) returns WIN]− 12 ∣∣. rADPA is said to have anonymity if,
for any given PPT algorithm A, AdvanonymrADPA,A(λ ,κ) is negligible in λ .
3.2.3 Deniability
Intuitively, deniability means privacy which states anti-forensic property that a third party is not able
to confirm whether a prover actually participate in the authentication protocol. Formally a definition is
given via the indistinguishability of the following two probability distributions Real and Sim, where A is
any given algorithm and S is an adaptively given algorithm to A.
Real(λ ,κ,(X ,id),(Y,RL )) def= View
(
〈P(SKXid),A〉((Y,RL ),PK)∣∣ Setup(1λ ,κ)→ (PK,MSK);KeyGen((X ,id),MSK)→ SKXid),
Sim(λ ,κ,(X ,id),(Y,RL )) def= View
(
〈S,A〉((Y,RL ),PK)∣∣ Setup(1λ ,κ)→ (PK,MSK);KeyGen((X ,id),MSK)→ SKXid).
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rADPA is said to have deniability if, for any given PPT algorithm A, there exists a PPT algorithm S s.t.
for any given PPT algorithm D it holds that
Pr[D(Real(λ ,κ,(X ,id),(Y,RL ))) = 1]
≈c Pr[D(Sim(λ ,κ,(X ,id),(Y,RL ))) = 1].
4 Generic Construction of Anonymous Deniable Predicate Authentica-
tion Scheme with Revocability
In this section, we give a generic construction of an rADPA scheme in Section 3 following the idea of
previous work [24].
4.1 Construction
The idea in [24], which originates from the work of Naor [15], is to combine an IND-CCA secure verifi-
able predicate encryption scheme with a perfectly binding commitment scheme. In our case, we follow
the above idea, but we employ a revocable attribute-based encryption scheme rABE as the predicate
encryption scheme. That is, we substitute the original ciphertext attribute Y of the predicate encryption
scheme with the pair of a ciphertext attribute and a revocation list (Y,RL ) of rABE.
Intuitively, the prototype of rADPA is a challenge-and-response protocol in which rABE is employed.
Then we modify it by, for each i = 1 to λ , dividing the “response” r̃ into two random strings ri0 and ri1
with a linear constraint r̃ = ri0 ⊕ ri1. Then we execute “commit and open” protocol with randomly
selected bits bi for i = 1 to λ .
Formally, the four PPT algorithms Setup, KeyGen, P and V of our scheme rADPA are generically
constructed as follows.
• Setup(1λ ,κ)→ (PK,MSK). On input the security parameter 1λ and the attribute index κ , the algo-
rithm executes rABE.Setup with the same input to obtain a pair of a public key PK and a master secret
keyMSK. It returns (PK,MSK).
• KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK)→ SKXid. On input a key attribute (X ,id), the public key PK and the
master secret key MSK, the algorithm executes rABE.KeyGen with the same input to obtain a private
secret key SKXid.
• 〈P(SKXid),V〉((Y,RL ),PK)→ 1/0. On common input a ciphertext attribute (Y,RL ) and the public
key PK and private input a private secret key SKXid to the prover P, first the verifier V chooses a random
string r ∈R {0,1}λ , and executes the encryption algorithm for the plaintext r with the randomness ρ
rABE.Enc((Y,RL ),PK,r;ρ). Then V sends the ciphertext CT to P.
Second, receiving the ciphertext CT , the prover P executes the decryption algorithm
rABE.Dec(SKXid,(Y,RL ),PK,CT ), and obtains the decryption result r̃. If r̃ = ⊥, then for i = 1 to
λ P chooses pairs of random strings (ri0,ri1) ∈R {0,1}λ ×{0,1}λ to be committed. Otherwise, for i = 1
to λ P chooses a random string ri0 ∈R {0,1}λ and computes ri1 := r̃⊕ ri0 (i.e. linear constraint). Then,
for i= 1 to λ and for j = 0,1 P computes a commitment Ci j←Com(ri j;γi j) with a randomness γi j ∈R R.
P sends all the commitments (Ci j)1≤i≤λj=0,1 to the verifier V.
Third, receiving the commitments, the verifier V chooses for i = 1 to λ the coins bi ∈R {0,1}, and
sends those coins to the prover P.
Fourth, receiving the coins, the prover P for i = 1 to λ opens the commitment Cibi by using the
randomness γibi as the opening key to get opened value r̂ibi . P sends all the opened values together with
the opening keys (r̂ibi ,γibi)
1≤i≤λ to the verifier V.
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Fifth, receiving the opened values together with the opening keys, the verifier V sends the random
plaintext r and the randomness ρ for encryption to the prover P.
Sixth, receiving the random plaintext r and the randomness ρ , the prover P for i = 1 to λ opens the
remaining commitment Cib̄i by using the randomness γib̄i as the opening key to get opened value r̂ib̄i . P
sends all the opened values together with the opening keys (r̂ib̄i ,γib̄i)
1≤i≤λ to the verifier V.
Finally, receiving the opened values together with the opening keys, the verifier V for i = 1 to λ
checks whether the following expected linear constraint holds or not: r =? ri0⊕ ri1. If all the equations
holds, then V returns 1 (accept), and otherwise, 0 (reject).
Fig.1 shows our construction of rADPA.
4.2 Security
The following three theorems are direct consequences of the corresponding theorems of Yamada et al.
[24] because our rADPA is their anonymous deniable predicate authentication scheme because our at-
tributes (X ,id) and (Y,RL ) can be seen as a key attribute and a ciphertext attribute for our extended
predicate function R̄κ . Therefore, we give a proof only for the corollary that is for the case of semi-
adaptive security.
Theorem 1 (Concurrent Soundness [24]). If rABE is IND-CCA secure and verifiable, and if Com is
perfectly binding, then our rADPA is concurrently sound. More precisely, for any given PPT algorithm





Corollary 1 (Semi-adaptive Concurrent Soundness). If rABE is semi-adaptively IND-CCA secure and
verifiable, and if Com is perfectly binding, then our rADPA is semi-adaptively and concurrently sound.
More precisely, for any given PPT algorithm A which is in accordance with Exprsemiad-c-soundrADPA,A (λ ,κ), there
exists a PPT algorithm B such that the following inequality holds.
Advsemiad-c-soundrADPA,A (λ ,κ)< Adv
ind-semiad-cca
rABE,B (λ ,κ) (3)
Proof. This is straightforward because the discussion of semi-adaptiveness is independently applied to
the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Anonymity [24]). If rABE is IND-CCA secure and verifiable, then our rADPA has
anonymity. More precisely, for any given unbounded algorithm A the following equality holds.
AdvanonymrADPA,A(λ ,κ) = 0 (4)
Theorem 3 (Deniability [24]). If rABE is correct, and if Com is computationally hiding, then our
rADPA has deniability. More precisely, for any given PPT algorithm D the following inequality holds.
Pr[D(Real(λ ,κ,(X ,id),(Y,RL ))) = 1] (5)
≈c Pr[D(Sim(λ ,κ,(X ,id),(Y,RL ))) = 1]. (6)
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Setup(1λ ,κ) KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK)
rABE.Setup(1λ ,κ) rABE.KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK)
→ (PK,MSK) → SKXid
return (PK,MSK) return SKXid





rABE.Dec(SKXid,(Y,RL ),PK,CT ) ←
→ r̃
If r̃ =⊥ then
For i = 1 to λ :
(ri0,ri1) ∈R {0,1}λ ×{0,1}λ
else
For i = 1 to λ :
ri0 ∈R {0,1}λ ,ri1 := r̃⊕ ri0
For i = 1 to λ :
For j = 0,1:
γi j ∈R R,Com(ri j;γi j)→Ci j
(Ci j)1≤i≤λj=0,1
→ For i = 1 to λ :
bi ∈R {0,1}
(bi)1≤i≤λ










→ For i = 1 to λ :
r =? ri0⊕ ri1
If all eqs. hold then return 1
else return 0
Figure 1: Our generic construction of anonymous deniable predicate authentication scheme with revoca-
bility, rADPA.
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Table 1: Instantiations
IND-CCA Secure rABE CmtSch Verifi- Message Security Assumptions
ABE (Flavor), IBR ability Len.
[3, 24] (KP-ABE), [3] EG [11] via [24] const. adap. mat-DH, EDHE
[3, 24] (KP-ABE), [6] EG [11] via [24] const. adap. mat-DH, EDHE
[19, 24] (KP-ABE), [3] EG [11] via [24] const. semi-adap. DLIN
[19, 24] (KP-ABE), [6] EG [11] via [24] const. semi-adap. DLIN
[1, 24](CP-ABE), [3] EG [11] via [24] const. semi-adap. SXDH, EDHE
[1, 24](CP-ABE), [6] EG [11] via [24] const. semi-adap. SXDH, EDHE
[19, 5, 24] (CP-ABE), [3] EG [11] via [24] const. semi-adap. DLIN
[19, 5, 24] (CP-ABE), [6] EG [11] via [24] const. semi-adap. DLIN
5 Discussion on Instantiations
In this section, we discuss how our generic construction of rADPA in Section 4 is instantiated in the
setting of bilinear groups (see, for example, [20]).
Our rADPA consists of the two building blocks: rABE and CmtSch. According to Theorem 1, 2 and
3 in Section 4, we need the correctness, IND-CCA security and verifiability for rABE and the perfectly
binding and computationally hiding properties for CmtSch. Further, according to the first construction
of rABE proposed in [22, 23], we are able to construct rABE from an attribute-based encryption scheme
(ABE) and an identity-based revocation scheme (IBR) in the pair encoding framework [3], which com-
bines ABE and IBR via the generic conjunctive conversion [7]. Note here that we have to apply the
CPA-to-CCA technique [24] to the component ABE scheme if it is needed. Thanks to the functionality-
preserving property [22, 23], if ABE is correct and IND-CCA secure, then so is the converted rABE.
As for verifiability, the adaptively or semi-adaptively secure ABE schemes which depend on the
dual-system encryption technique [20, 4] are not verifiable in their proposed forms. However, they can
be modified into verifiable schemes (as is mentioned in [24]). That is, a prover P is given two private
secret keys SKXid and SK
′X
id with different randomness in the key generation phase. In the decryption
phase, the two keys are used independently for a single ciphertext; if the result is the same, then the
verification output is 1 (legitimate), and otherwise, 0 (illegitimate). Hence we obtain verifiable adaptively
or semi-adaptively IND-CCA secure rABE, respectively.
Among possible instantiations, we are interested in semi-adaptively secure rABE with constant size
ciphertexts. This is because, in the semi-adaptive security model, adversaries choose the target (in our
case (Y ∗,RL ∗)) after seeing a public key PK and before issuing any queries. This model is natural and
sufficient in the case of authentication (see Section 2.2.2), which makes a contrast to the case of encryp-
tion. As for constant-size property of ciphertexts, when an authentication scheme is applied in a real net-
work protocol, the message length should preferably be constant. There are adaptively or semi-adaptively
secure ABE schemes with constant size ciphertexts in the flavor of key-policy (KP) and ciphertext-policy,
such as KP-ABE schemes of Attrapadung [3] and Takashima [19] and CP-ABE schemes of Agrawal and
Chase [1] and Takashima [19] with the KP-to-CP transform of Attrapadung et al. [5]. Also, there are
IBR schemes with constant size ciphertexts [3, 6]. Hence we can actually instantiate our rADPA with
constant message length. In that cases the IND-CCA securities of ABE and IBR are under the matrix
Diffie-Hellman assumption (mat-DH) or the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) and the ex-
tended DH exponent assumption (EDHE), or, the decisional linear assumption (DLIN), respectively (see
Table 1).
As for a commitment scheme CmtSch with the perfectly binding and computationally hiding prop-
erties, we can employ the ElGamal encryption scheme (EG) [11]. The computationally hiding prop-
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Setup(1λ ,κ) KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK)
ABE.Setup(1λ ,κ) ABE.KeyGen((X ,id),PK,MSK)
→ (PK,MSK) → SKX ,id
return (PK,MSK) return SKX ,id





ABE.Dec(SKX ,id,(Y,RL ),PK,CT ) ←
→ r̃
If r̃ =⊥ then
For i = 1 to λ :
(ri0,ri1) ∈R GT ×GT
else
For i = 1 to λ :
ri0 ∈R GT ,ri1 := r̃ · r−1i0
For i = 1 to λ :
For j = 0,1:
γi j ∈R GT ,Com(ri j;γi j)→Ci j
(Ci j)1≤i≤λj=0,1
→ For i = 1 to λ :
bi ∈R {0,1}
(bi)1≤i≤λ










→ For i = 1 to λ :
r =? ri0 · ri1
If all eqs. hold then return 1
else return 0
Figure 2: Instantiation of our generic rADPA in the setting of bilinear groups.
erty is obtained from the indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks, which is under the Diffie-
Hellman assumption (DH). Note that the DH assumption is implied from the mat-DH assumption.
Table 1 summarizes the above discussion, and Figure 2 shows the instantiation in the setting of
bilinear groups.
6 Conclusion
We proposed an anonymous deniable predicate authentication scheme with revocability, rADPA, which
has strong privacy protection properties. We gave the syntax and formal security definitions of rADPA;
concurrent soundness, anonymity and deniability. Then we showed a generic construction of rADPA,
whose building blocks are a revocable attribute-based encryption scheme, rABE, and a commitment
scheme, CmtSch. We stated that, when rABE and CmtSch have suitable properties, then our rADPA
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attains the security properties. Finally, we discussed how our generic construction of rADPA is instan-
tiated. Our future work would be a feasibility study of our rADPA by implementation. Also, we have
to examine how the six-round authentication protocol of our rADPA is feasible in real scenarios in the
internet.
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